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THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION:  STARTING 
UP AGAIN 
THE HONORABLE DIANA E. MURPHY* 
I am pleased to be in St. Louis today to talk with you about the United 
States Sentencing Commission, and particularly about our newly minted 
Commission.  The tie that binds all of us at this Conference is our mutual 
interest in justice, and it is of special significance to me that our first outside 
dialogue on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is here at Saint Louis 
University in the city where my court is headquartered and where I have so 
many friends and colleagues. 
After a lengthy political process involving both the White House and the 
Senate, a full Commission was appointed by President Clinton on November 
15, 1999.1  We went to work immediately upon appointment, meeting in 
Washington the next two days, to set a priority short-term agenda for the 
agency and to begin addressing some substantive sentencing issues.2  We also 
began to consider how we might best structure our own deliberations for 
addressing policy areas.3 
After our meeting on November 16 and 17, 1999, we met two days in 
December and four days in early January.  Our agenda naturally included 
organizational and administrative matters in addition to a number of possible 
Guideline amendments on some of the most pressing sentencing issues.4  As a 
 
* Chair, United States Sentencing Commission.  United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth 
Circuit (1994 -    ); United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota (1979-1994); Chief 
Judge (1992-1994). 
 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 2. On December 8, 1999, the Commission published in the Federal Register a notice 
identifying the congressional directives, other crime legislation, and the circuit conflicts we will 
address in this amendment cycle.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 68,715 (1999). 
 3. As an agency engaged in “informal rulemaking” under the notice and comment 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, the Commission has 
considerable flexibility on how it structures its own internal deliberations, as well as its 
communications with various external groups interested in federal sentencing.  See generally, 
JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 225-44 (3d ed. 1998); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 
(1981). 
 4. In December, the Commission voted in a public meeting to publish Guideline 
amendment proposals in the Federal Register on two of the policy items on its agenda, namely 
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result of our earlier planning, we were able very quickly and unanimously to 
publish several amendment proposals in the Federal Register. We look forward 
to receiving comments and reaction from the interested public. 
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to give you a bit of background 
information about who the new commissioners are, how these policy issues 
came to be on our agenda, and how it is that we have been able to start 
addressing them so promptly. 
THE NEW COMMISSION 
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the Commission is made up of seven 
voting members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  At 
least three of the voting members must be federal judges and not more than 
four may belong to the same political party.5  The new commissioners are all 
well qualified. The three vice chairs are Judge Ruben Castillo of the Northern 
District of Illinois, Judge William Sessions of the District of Vermont, and Mr. 
John Steer, for many years past the General Counsel of the Commission. The 
other commissioners are Judge Sterling Johnson of the Eastern District of New 
York, Judge Joe Kendall of the Northern District of Texas, and Professor 
Michael O’Neill, assistant professor at George Mason University School of 
Law and previously General Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee.  
Under our organic statute, there are also two nonvoting, ex officio members of 
the Commission,6 presently Michael Gaines, the Chairman of the United States 
Parole Commission, and Laird Kirkpatrick, Assistant Attorney General in the 
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Five of the commissioners are 
federal judges who have all actually applied the Guidelines in sentencing 
individuals, three have had prosecutorial experience and two have had criminal 
defense experience, two are former police officers, and several previously 
worked as congressional staff.  In short, the new commissioners bring a wealth 
of experience and several different perspectives, just as the Sentencing Reform 
Act intended. 
We began to get to know each other in the summer of 1999 when it 
appeared we all might be appointed at any time.  I took the initiative to set up 
several conference calls with the other possible appointees and Tim McGrath, 
the interim staff director of the Commission.  We were not presumptuous about 
 
copyright and trademark infringement and telemarketing fraud.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 72,129 (1999).  
In January, the Commission voted to publish Guideline proposals in the Federal Register with 
respect to methamphetamine trafficking offenses and identity theft offenses.  See 65 Fed. Reg. 
2,663 (1999).  Throughout the spring of 2000, the Commission hopes to meet with a number of 
groups that are interested in the federal criminal justice system as it begins addressing these and 
the other priority policy issues.  The Commission has planned a public hearing for March 23, 
2000, in Washington, D.C. 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 992 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 6. Id. 
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our potential nominations, but we wanted to be able to function effectively if 
we were appointed. These preliminary discussions were particularly geared 
toward how we might best get started and oriented if appointed and toward 
saving some dates on our calendars for possible meeting times.  I am not sure 
we realized at the time just how helpful these preliminary discussions would 
turn out to be.  When the appointment process took longer than anticipated, we 
were grateful that we were prepared to start immediately after we officially 
took office in mid November.  That preliminary work positioned us to hit the 
ground running the very next day after appointment. 
Throughout this process, the capable staff at the Commission has been 
invaluable. The staff is dedicated and talented and includes attorneys who 
analyze issues and do legal drafting, social scientists who do research, former 
probation officers who provide training and telephone helpline assistance on 
Guideline application, and data entry employees and analysts who extract and 
analyze data collected from all cases sentenced under the Guidelines each year. 
The staff’s good work to prepare for our arrival is particularly remarkable 
because it was done without any direction from commissioners.  The absence 
of voting commissioners for a long period had the unfortunate effect of 
decreased appropriations for the Commission and staffing shortages that have 
gone unaddressed.  In order to meet our responsibilities, the new Commission 
must get the budget and staff fully restored.  Otherwise we cannot fulfill all of 
our statutory obligations. 
The essential responsibility that could not be carried out in the absence of 
commissioners was of course the agency’s duty to promulgate and modify the 
Guidelines.  With no voting commissioners for thirteen months, from October 
1998 through mid November 1999, the Commission could not make any 
changes to the Guidelines during its regular amendment cycle in 1999.  Even 
in 1997 and 1998, the Commission found it difficult to make changes to the 
Guidelines because it operated with only four voting members for much of that 
time, which meant that a unanimous vote was necessary before any 
amendments could be promulgated.7 
As a result of these chronic commissioner vacancies, important sentencing 
policy issues have gone unaddressed over the past few years.  Those policy 
issues arose in a number of contexts.  Recently enacted crime legislation 
specifically directed the Commission to make changes to the Sentencing 
Guidelines for a number of criminal offenses, most notably in the areas of 
intellectual property infringement, telemarketing fraud, fraudulent cloning of 
wireless telephones, unlawful identity theft, and criminal sexual offenses 
against children.  Other recently enacted crime legislation did not contain 
express instructions to the Commission but did make changes in the 
 
 7. Four affirmative votes are needed to promulgate Guidelines and Guideline amendments.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1994). 
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substantive criminal law, such as in the areas of firearms and 
methamphetamine offenses.  The Commission must carefully review those 
changes to determine whether amendments should be incorporated into the 
Guidelines.  In addition, a variety of circuit conflicts on the application of the 
Guidelines also went unresolved, and under Braxton v. United States,8 the 
Commission has the responsibility to resolve these circuit conflicts on 
Guideline interpretation. 
THE GUIDELINE AMENDMENT CYCLE 
Adding to the difficulty of addressing this significant backlog of policy 
issues is the fact that the new commissioners are confronting a very 
abbreviated time frame this year in which to begin addressing them.  The time 
is short because the Commission operates under an annual cycle for amending 
the Guidelines that is governed by a number of procedural requirements.  
Those requirements, including provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act9 
that require public notice of any proposed amendments and an opportunity for 
the public to comment on them, are set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act and 
in the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.10  Under those 
requirements, when the Commission wants to amend the Guidelines, it must 
first submit the amendments to Congress for a 180-day review period. The 
deadline for submitting them is May 1 in any given year. 
The May 1 submission to Congress is the culmination of a process that 
typically starts in June or July of the previous year.  At that time, the 
Commission begins to work with its staff and various groups involved in the 
federal criminal justice system to inform itself of the policy issues at hand.  As 
a result of this work, the Commission usually develops proposals for Guideline 
amendments by December or January.  Those proposals, if they receive the 
affirmative vote of three commissioners, are published in the Federal Register.  
It is this publication that gives the public notice of the proposals and an 
opportunity to comment on them.  The Commission then typically conducts a 
public hearing on the issues in March.  By April, the Commission has refined 
its proposed Guideline amendments, and then takes a final vote on whether to 
adopt them.  Not later than May 1, the Commission sends the promulgated 
amendments to Congress, together with a statement of reasons for the 
amendments.  This entire process is commonly referred to as the “Guideline 
amendment cycle.” 
The point I want to emphasize is that the Guideline amendment cycle is a 
deliberative process.  It builds in sufficient time for the thoughtful 
 
 8. 500 U.S. 344 (1991). 
 9. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). 
 10. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994); 5 U.S.C. §553 (1994); USSC Rules of Practice 
and Procedure. 
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development of fair and effective sentencing policy.  You see the challenge we 
face by being appointed in mid-November, well into that cycle.  All of the new 
commissioners are mindful of the many important and unaddressed policy 
issues on our plate and the need to respond to congressional directives to 
amend the Guidelines for particular criminal offenses.  We know we can 
strengthen the agency’s credibility and good working relationship with 
Congress and others in the federal criminal justice community by responding 
to these directives as soon as possible.  We are also strongly committed to 
ensuring that the sentencing policies we ultimately adopt and implement are of 
the highest quality, that they are workable, fit well within the existing 
Guidelines framework, and serve the purposes of sentencing identified in the 
Sentencing Reform Act. 
COMMISSION RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT 
In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress gave the Commission 
the responsibility  to establish and maintain federal sentencing guidelines.  The 
first set of Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987, and have now 
been used to sentence over 400,000 defendants.  These Guidelines are required 
under the Act to serve four purposes of sentencing: just punishment, 
deterrence, protection of the public from further criminal conduct, and 
rehabilitation of criminal offenders.11  Congress also intended that the 
Guidelines reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity and provide for sentences 
appropriate for the particular offense involved.  Another major object was to 
create real-time sentencing by eliminating the parole system;12 time given was 
to be time served.  Judicial discretion before the Guidelines had not been 
unconstrained because the United States Parole Commission, not the 
sentencing judge, ultimately determined how much time an offender actually 
spent in prison, and prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions has always 
been great. 
Congress also gave the Commission another key mission: to serve as an 
expert agency on federal sentencing matters and criminal policy.  In order to 
fulfill this part of its mission, the Commission was given continuing 
responsibility under the Sentencing Reform Act in many areas, including: 
(1) establishing sentencing policies and practices that assure that the 
purposes of sentencing are met, that provide certainty and fairness in meeting 
those purposes, that avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities while 
maintaining enough flexibility for individualized sentences when those are 
 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 12. See § 218(a)(5) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2027, 
which repealed chapter 311 of title 18, United States Code, relating to parole. 
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warranted, and that reflect advancements in our knowledge of human behavior 
as it relates to the criminal justice process;13 
(2) developing means to measure the effectiveness of sentencing, penal, 
and correctional practices in meeting the purposes of sentencing;14 
(3) promulgating and updating Sentencing Guidelines for federal 
offenders;15 
(4) monitoring the performance of probation officers on sentencing 
recommendations, including application of the Guidelines;16 
(5) issuing instructions to probation officers concerning the application 
of the Guidelines;17 
(6) establishing a research and development program within the 
Commission18 to serve as a clearinghouse for information on federal 
sentencing practices; 
(7) consulting with federal courts, departments, and agencies in 
developing, maintaining, and coordinating sound sentencing practices; 
(8) systematically collecting data obtained from studies, research, and 
the empirical experience of public and private agencies concerning the 
sentencing process;19 
(9) publishing data concerning the sentencing process;20 
(10) systematically collecting and disseminating information concerning 
sentences actually imposed on the over 50,000 cases sentenced in the district 
courts each year (and on over 750 reported appellate opinions on sentencing), 
and the relationship of those sentences to the factors judges are required to 
consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a);21 
(11) systematically collecting and disseminating information regarding 
effectiveness of sentences imposed;22 
(12) conducting seminars and workshops around the country to provide 
continuing studies for people engaged in the sentencing field;23 
 
 13. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).  Under the statute, the Commission must meet a host of 
substantive and procedural requirements in making these Guidelines.  For example, under 28 
U.S.C. § 994(s) (1994), the Commission must give due consideration to petitions submitted by 
federal prisoners who would like the Commission to modify the Guidelines under which those 
prisoners were sentenced. 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(9) (1994). 
 17. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(10) (1994). 
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(12) (1994). 
 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(13) (1994). 
 20. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(14) (1994). 
 21. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(15) (1994). 
 22. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(16) (1994). 
 23. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(17) (1994). 
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(13) conducting periodic training programs for judicial and probation 
personnel and other persons connected with the sentencing process;24 
(14) studying the feasibility of developing Guidelines for juvenile 
offenders;25 
(15) making recommendations to Congress on changes that might be 
made to statutes relating to sentencing, penal, and correctional matters that 
would help to carry out effective, humane, and rational sentencing policy;26 
(16) holding hearings and calling witnesses to assist the Commission in 
the exercise of its powers and duties;27 
(17) performing any other functions necessary to permit federal courts and 
others in the federal criminal justice system to meet their responsibilities in the 
sentencing area;28  and 
(18) recommending any changes in prison facilities that may be necessary 
because of the Guidelines.29 
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIVES TO THE COMMISSION 
Balancing all of this continuing responsibility with the immediate concerns 
of an abbreviated amendment cycle this year and the significant backlog of 
pending policy work, the new Commission decided to focus in the short term 
on implementing congressional directives and other crime legislation and on 
resolving a number of circuit conflicts regarding sentencing application.  
Responding to directives is a principal priority, but there are a number of 
directives currently outstanding in a variety of areas. 
In the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997,30 Congress expanded the 
scope of the criminal copyright infringement provisions to include 
infringement that occurs through electronic means, regardless of whether the 
defendant benefited financially or commercially from the crime.  In addition, 
Congress directed the Commission to ensure that the Guideline penalties for all 
intellectual property offenses generally provide sufficient deterrence and 
specifically provide for consideration of the retail value and quantity of 
 
 24. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(18) (1994). 
 25. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(19) (1994).  The Commission examined the issue of Guidelines 
for juvenile offenders early on but recently has begun to focus on juvenile justice again, 
particularly in light of legislation, still pending in Congress, that would require the Commission 
to develop Guidelines for juvenile offenders. 
 26. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(20) (1994). 
 27. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(21) (1994).  The Commission usually holds a hearing on 
pending Guideline amendments in March of each year.  It also periodically holds meetings and 
symposia on particular sentencing issues, usually in Washington but also in other parts of the 
country. 
 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 995 (a)(22) (1994). 
 29. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (g) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
 30. Pub. L. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
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infringed items.  In enacting the NET Act, Congress expressed concern that the 
existing infringement Guideline neither sufficiently deters these offenses nor 
adequately accounts for the pecuniary harm they cause, particularly with 
respect to online electronic infringement.  What we have found so far is that 
quantifying the pecuniary harm caused by these offenses is difficult, making it 
a challenge to develop the most appropriate response to the directive.  
Moreover, Congress recently passed legislation, the Digital Theft Deterrence 
and Copyright Damages Improvement Act,31 that requires us to take action by 
April 6 of this year.  We have been working very hard on our response to this 
directive during the past few months and at the December public meeting, just 
one month after we were appointed, we voted to publish in the Federal 
Register a number of options for how we might respond.32 
In the Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998,33 Congress 
strengthened criminal statutes relating to fraud against consumers, particularly 
the elderly.  In addition to providing enhanced penalties for conspiracies to 
commit fraud offenses that involve telemarketing, the Act required criminal 
forfeiture of telemarketing fraud proceeds.  The Act also directed the 
Commission to take action on an expedited basis (and by that I mean outside 
the May 1 amendment cycle) to provide substantially increased penalties for 
persons convicted of telemarketing offenses.  In doing so, Congress 
specifically directed the Commission to provide increased sentences for cases 
involving sophisticated means and for telemarketing fraud cases in which a 
large number of vulnerable victims are affected by the fraudulent scheme.  
Like Congress, the Commission for some time had been concerned with the 
growing seriousness and frequency of telemarketing frauds, particularly those 
perpetrated against the elderly. 
In May 1998, even before enactment of the Act, the previous Commission 
had adopted amendments to increase sentences for telemarketing fraud 
offenses and for other fraud offenses that use mass marketing.  In response to 
the Act, the previous Commission also made expedited Guideline amendments 
that expanded upon these earlier amendments.  Because they were made on an 
expedited basis, the later amendments were only temporary, however, and they 
must be passed again in the coming amendment cycle in order to become 
permanent changes to the Guidelines.34  At our December public meeting, we 
 
 31. Pub. L. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999). 
 32. See 64 Fed. Reg. 72,129 (1999). 
 33. Pub. L. 105-184, 112 Stat. 520 (1998). 
 34. The requirement to repromulgate an emergency amendment in order for the amendment 
to remain in effect derives from section 21(a) of the Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-182, 
101 Stat. 1271 (1987).  The authority under that Act formed the basis for the authority to 
promulgate emergency amendments in the Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998. 
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voted to publish in the Federal Register a notice of our intent to make those 
amendments permanent.35 
The Wireless Telephone Protection Act of 1998,36 among other things, 
eliminated the intent to defraud element for defendants who knowingly use, 
produce, or traffic in certain equipment used to clone cellular telephones, and it 
clarified the statutory penalty provisions for cellular telephone cloning 
offenses.  Congress also directed the Commission to review and, if appropriate, 
amend the Guidelines to provide an appropriate penalty for offenses involving 
the fraudulent cloning of wireless telephones.  In passing this legislation, 
Congress expressed its concern over the increasing fraudulent cloning of 
wireless telephones.  In particular, Congress was aware of the substantial 
economic harm to the wireless telephone industry and the prevalent use of 
cloned wireless telephones to commit other crimes. 
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 199837 
criminalized the use or transfer of an individual’s social security number, date 
of birth, credit cards, and any other identification means (including unique 
biometric data), without that individual’s authorization to do so, in order to 
commit any federal or state felony.  The Act also provided maximum statutory 
penalties of up to three, fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years, depending on the 
presence of certain enumerated factors.  Another key change was to expand the 
scope of victims affected by such offenses to include the individuals whose 
names or other identification means were misused, not just the financial 
institutions that may have sustained economic losses as a result of these 
crimes.  In addition, Congress directed the Commission to review and, if 
appropriate, amend the Guidelines to provide an appropriate penalty for each 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1028, relating to fraud in connection with 
identification means.  Tailoring an appropriate response to address the conduct 
that Congress seemed most concerned about is difficult because the Act 
implicates a wide range of offense conduct prosecuted under numerous 
existing statutes and covered by a variety of Sentencing Guidelines. 
The Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 199838 created 
two new crimes: (1) the transmittal of information identifying minors for 
criminal sexual purposes; and (2) the distribution of obscene materials to 
minors.  The Act provided increased statutory penalties for existing crimes that 
address sexual activity with minors and child pornography.  It also expressed 
Congress’s zero tolerance for the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.  In 
addition, Congress directed the Commission to: (1) provide an increased 
sentence for offenses relating to the transportation of individuals for illegal 
 
 35. See 64 Fed. Reg. 72,129 (1999). 
 36. Pub. L. 105-172, 112 Stat. 53 (1998). 
 37. Pub. L. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998). 
 38. Pub. L. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998). 
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sexual activity; (2) provide an increased sentence if the defendant used a 
computer in connection with a sexual offense against a minor; (3) provide an 
increased sentence if the defendant knowingly misrepresented the defendant’s 
identity in connection with a sexual offense against a minor; (4) increase the 
penalties in any case in which the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity 
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor; and (5) amend the 
Guidelines to clarify that the term “distribution of pornography” in the 
Guidelines relating to distribution of child pornography applies to distribution 
for both pecuniary and non pecuniary interests.  Many of these requirements 
directly respond to recommendations the Commission made a few years ago in 
a report to Congress on sexual abuse and exploitation. 
In addition to directives to the Commission, Congress has enacted several 
pieces of crime legislation that have implications for the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  For example, the Methamphetamine Trafficking Control Act of 
199839 increased the penalties for manufacturing, importing, or trafficking in 
methamphetamine by reducing by one half the quantity of pure substance and 
methamphetamine mixture required to trigger the separate five and ten year 
mandatory minimum sentences in the drug statutes.  In 1997, the Commission 
amended the drug Guidelines to reduce by half the quantity of 
methamphetamine mixture required to receive five and ten year sentences 
under the Guidelines.  This was a response to congressional directives enacted 
the year before.  In light of this most recent Act, it may be appropriate to 
amend the Guidelines similarly to reduce by half the amount of pure substance 
required to receive those five and ten year sentences under the Guidelines. 
Congress addressed certain serious firearms offenses in Public Law 105-
386,40 which amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to create a tiered system of 
sentencing enhancement ranges.  Each range has a mandatory minimum and 
presumed life maximum for cases in which a firearm is involved in a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking offense.  The pertinent minimum sentence in that 
tiered system is dependent on whether the firearm was possessed, brandished, 
or discharged.  The Act also changed the mandatory minimum for second or 
subsequent convictions under § 924(c) from twenty to twenty-five years, and it 
broadly defined the term “brandish.”  These legislative changes will require a 
number of amendments to the Guidelines, including amendments that 
incorporate the tiered statutory sentencing scheme into the Guideline 
pertaining to § 924(c).  The Guideline in its current form does not contemplate 
a tiered system of punishment; in a “flat” fashion, it simply calls for a term of 
imprisonment as “required by statute.”  In PUBLIC LAW 105-277,41 Congress 
amended 18 U.S.C. § 922 to prohibit an alien who is lawfully present in the 
 
 39. Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 40. 112 Stat. 3469 (1998). 
 41. 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
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United States under a non-immigrant visa from possessing or otherwise being 
involved in a firearms offense.  A conforming change to the definition of 
prohibited persons for purposes of the firearms Guidelines is appropriate. 
CONFLICTS IN GUIDELINES INTERPRETATION BY 
THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL 
Another very important responsibility, delegated to the Commission by the 
Supreme Court,42 is to resolve conflicts among the circuit courts of appeal 
regarding Sentencing Guideline issues.  We have decided to address five of the 
most pressing conflicts this year. 
The circuit courts are split on what can pass as a “single act of aberrant 
behavior” for purposes of downward departure under the Guidelines.43  Seven 
circuits have held that the departure should be narrowly defined to include only 
a spontaneous and thoughtless act by the defendant, not multiple acts occurring 
over a period of time.  Four circuits define this departure more broadly to 
include consideration of the totality of the circumstances.44 
There is also a circuit conflict regarding whether the fraud Guideline 
enhancement in § 2F1.1(b)(4)(B), for violation of a judicial or administrative 
order, injunction, decree, or process, applies to falsely completing bankruptcy 
schedules and forms.  Six circuits view fraudulent bankruptcy court filings as 
violations of judicial orders or process.  Two circuits require that a defendant 
have violated a specific order from a prior proceeding before applying the 
enhancement.45 
The circuits disagree on whether exceptional post sentence rehabilitation 
can permit downward departure on resentencing after a remand.  Five circuits 
have held that it can.  The Eighth Circuit holds, however, that a departure on 
 
 42. See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348-49. 
 43. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.4 (d) (1999). 
 44. Compare United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555 (1st Cir. 1996) (adopting totality of 
circumstances test); Zecevic v. United States Parole Comm’n, 163 F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486 (10th 
Cir. 1991); with United States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994) (single act of aberrant 
behavior requires a spontaneous, thoughtless, single act involving lack of planning); United States 
v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garlich, 951 F.2d 161 (8th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Withrow, 85 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dyce, 78 
F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1996), amended by 91 F.3d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 45. Compare United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (bankruptcy fraud 
implicates the violation of a judicial or administrative order or process within the meaning of 
§2F1.1 (b)(3)(B)); United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lloyd, 
947 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Welch, 103 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 
1994); with United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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this ground unfairly differentiates between classes of defendants, with some of 
those defendants benefiting because of an unrelated legal error in their original 
sentencing, and that it also duplicates good time credits awarded by the Bureau 
of Prisons.46 
Another circuit conflict deals with enhanced sentences for drug offenses 
occurring near locations such as schools or involving children or pregnant 
women.  Three circuits hold the view that the enhancement applies only when 
a defendant is convicted of such an offense.  Three other circuits take the 
broader view that the enhanced sentences apply whenever a defendant’s 
relevant conduct included drug sales in a protected location or to a protected 
individual.47 
There is also a circuit split regarding whether a court can base an upward 
departure on conduct that was dismissed or uncharged in connection with a 
plea agreement in the case.  Six circuits allow an upward departure based on 
such conduct, while three others do not.48 
ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY MAKING AFTER MISTRETTA 
As you can see, the Commission has a lot to do even in the short term, and 
no sooner was I in office than it was time to submit the budget for fiscal year 
 
 46. Compare United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 1375, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (postconviction 
rehabilitation is not a prohibited factor and, therefore, sentencing courts may consider it as a 
possible ground for downward departure at resentencing); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 75 
(2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Brock, 108 
F.3d 31 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rudolph, 190 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Green, 152 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998); with United States v. Sims, 174 F.3d 911 
(8th Cir. 1999) (district court lacks authority at resentencing following an appeal to depart of 
ground of postconviction rehabilitation which occurred after the original sentencing). 
 47. Compare United States v. Chandler, 125 F.3d 892, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1997) (the 
sentencing court should determine the offense Guideline section most applicable to the offense of 
conviction using Appendix A, then, once the appropriate Guideline is identified, a court can take 
relevant conduct into account only as it relates to factors set forth in that Guideline); United 
States v. Locklear, 24 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311 (11th 
Cir. 1998); with United States v. Clay, 117 F.3d 317 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 395 (1997) 
(applying § 2D1.2 to defendant convicted only of possession with intent to distribute under 21 
U.S.C. § 841 (but not convicted of any statute referenced to § 2D1.2) based on underlying facts 
indicating defendant involved a juvenile in drug sales); United States v. Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584 
(8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Robles, 814 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa), aff’d, 8 F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 
1993) (court looks to relevant conduct to determine appropriate Guideline). 
 48. Compare United States v. Figaro, 935 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing upward departure 
based on uncharged conduct); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 243 (1997); United States v. Cross, 121 
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Big Medicine, 73 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 1995); with United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 
1066 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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2001.  The Chair of the Commission has the statutory responsibility to direct 
the preparation of requests for appropriations and to direct the use of 
appropriated funds.49  The appropriations request is especially critical this year 
because the budget was decreased and staff reduced during the time when the 
Commission had no voting members.  All of this is complicated and requires 
much communication. 
Before coming to St. Louis, I decided to step back from the ongoing work 
to take another look at Mistretta v. United States50 to see exactly what the 
Supreme Court had said there about the Commission and policy.  I was 
surprised to see how closely Justice Blackmun’s 1989 description of the 
Commission as an institution paralleled my own observations during the past 
few months.  The Court referred to the “significantly political nature of the 
Commission’s work[,]”51 and I have seen what a different experience it is from 
judging.  The commissioners were described as policy makers and 
administrators who exercise “political judgment about crime and 
criminality[.]”52  Justice Blackmun also wrote that “[t]he Sentencing 
Commission unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of 
our Government[,]”53 being a “political or quasi-legislative”54 agency within 
the Judicial Branch.  It is “an independent agency . . . fully accountable to 
Congress”55 with “rulemaking [power] . . . subject to the notice and comment 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 994(x).”56 
One of the first things I wanted to do after appointment was to contact 
people with experience to learn how the Commission deliberates and reaches 
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.  For judges this is a very 
different kind of decision making, and one paragraph in Mistretta describes the 
contrast well: 
The judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their status 
and authority as Article III judges, but solely because of their appointment by 
the President as the Act directs. Such power as these judges wield as 
Commissioners is not judicial power; it is administrative power derived from 
the enabling legislation. Just as the nonjudicial members of the Commission 
act as administrators, bringing their experience and wisdom to bear on the 
problems of sentencing disparity, so too the judges, uniquely qualified on the 
subject of sentencing, assume a wholly administrative role upon entering into 
the deliberations of the Commission. In other words, the Constitution, at least 
 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 993 (b)(2) (1994). 
 50. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 51. Id. at 393. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 384. 
 54. Id. at 393. 
 55. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393. 
 56. Id. at 394. 
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as a per se matter, does not forbid judges to wear two hats; it merely forbids 
them to wear both hats at the same time.57 
I understand exactly what Justice Blackmun meant about not wearing two 
hats at the same time, but I have to confess that I feel like I am wearing at least 
two hats on any given day, with all of the things there are to do as an active 
judge and as Chair of the Commission.  But I draw strength from both the 
policy goals in the Sentencing Reform Act and the eloquent discussion in 
Mistretta about the importance of the Commission’s work.  They answer the 
question frequently asked as to why anyone would willingly take on these 
responsibilities. 
In closing I can assure you that we are committed to work thoughtfully to 
accomplish as much as we reasonably can during this abbreviated amendment 
cycle.  It is our great hope that in demonstrating our commitment to addressing 
the issues before us as soon as we reasonably can, we will strengthen the 
Commission’s credibility and its working relationship with Congress and 
others interested in federal sentencing.  We want to reach out to all who have 
an interest in the federal criminal justice system and to listen to their views 
about the Sentencing Guidelines and related issues and to engage in an 
ongoing dialogue.  We have to come to meetings like this.  We have to listen to 
problems that people are having with the Guidelines and to their suggestions 
for change. 
The Sentencing Reform Act has very noble goals, and we aim to try to 
meet them and hope over the long term to make an increasingly meaningful 
contribution to fair and effective sentencing policy. 
 
 
 57. Id. at 404. 
